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Abstract
IP blacklists are a well-regarded anti-spam mechanism that capture global spamming patterns. These
properties make such lists a practical ground-truth by which to study email spam behaviors. Observing one
blacklist for nearly a year-and-a-half, we collected data on roughly *half a billion* listing events. In this paper,
that data serves two purposes.
First, we conduct a measurement study on the dynamics of blacklists and email spam at-large. The magnitude/
duration of the data enables scrutiny of long-term trends, at scale. Further, these statistics help parameterize
our second task: the mining of blacklist history for temporal association rules. That is, we search for IP
addresses with correlated histories. Strong correlations would suggest group members are not independent
entities and likely share botnet membership.
Unfortunately, we find that statistically significant groupings are rare. This result is reinforced when rules are
evaluated in terms of their ability to: (1) identify shared botnet members, using ground-truth from botnet
infiltrations and sinkholes, and (2) predict future blacklisting events. In both cases, performance
improvements over a control classifier are nominal. This outcome forces us to re-examine the appropriateness
of blacklist data for this task, and suggest refinements to our mining model that may allow it to better capture
the dynamics by which botnets operate.
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ABSTRACT
IP blacklists are a well-regarded anti-spam mechanism that
capture global spamming patterns. These properties make
such lists a practical ground-truth by which to study email
spam behaviors. Observing one blacklist for nearly a year-
and-a-half, we collected data on roughly half a billion listing
events. In this paper, that data serves two purposes.
First, we conduct a measurement study on the dynamics
of blacklists and email spam at-large. The magnitude/durat-
ion of the data enables scrutiny of long-term trends, at scale.
Further, these statistics help parameterize our second task:
the mining of blacklist history for temporal association rules.
That is, we search for IP addresses with correlated histories.
Strong correlations would suggest group members are not
independent entities and likely share botnet membership.
Unfortunately, we find that statistically significant group-
ings are rare. This result is reinforced when rules are eval-
uated in terms of their ability to: (1) identify shared bot-
net members, using ground-truth from botnet infiltrations
and sinkholes, and (2) predict future blacklisting events. In
both cases, performance improvements over a control classi-
fier are nominal. This outcome forces us to re-examine the
appropriateness of blacklist data for this task, and suggest
refinements to our mining model that may allow it to better
capture the dynamics by which botnets operate.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: Security
and protection; K.6.5 [Management of Computing and
Info. Systems]: Security and Protection; H.2.8 [Database
Management]: Database applications—Data mining
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1. INTRODUCTION
Email spam is a topic that requires little introduction. In
2010, it was estimated that spam compromised nearly 90%
of all email sent [37], consuming significant resources. IP
blacklists have become a standard tool in mitigating such
traffic, with research reporting high detection rates [24, 39].
Efficiency is likely one reason IP blacklists are commonly
employed. While spam detection using natural-language
processing (NLP) is known to be effective, it also requires
considerable resources. Therefore, there has been much re-
cent research on pre-filtering mails using only “network-level
properties” [31, 32]. In particular, “temporal” [20, 39] and
“spatial” [20, 30, 33, 38, 39] techniques have been proposed.
Such mechanisms can be used to proactively blacklist mali-
cious addresses (before they can send spam), by extrapolat-
ing from current evidence or leveraging historical patterns.
By the end of 2010, sources indicate that 88% of email
spam originates from botnets, a significant increase over ear-
lier statistics [37, 41]. This rising prevalence may prove
problematic for spatio-temporal detection schemes. For ex-
ample, botnets’ massively distributed nature means that in-
fected hosts are not confined to organizational/geographic
boundaries, or contiguous regions of address space [37, 43];
assumptions on which many spatial methodologies depend.
Thus, to a large extent, the spam detection task has be-
come equivalent to the botnet identification one. At the
network-level, the ability to recognize botnet membership
is limited. Given botnets’ use of P2P communication, re-
cent proposals [18, 27] suggest processing expansive network
flows/graphs. While effective over simulated traces, scope
and privacy issues hamper practical application.
Beyond the network-level, more significant progress has
been made by investigating spam email content. Much re-
search identifies spam campaigns (and therefore, botnets)
using the similarity of: (1) spam email bodies, (2) URLs in
spam email bodies, and/or (3) content at those URL desti-
nations [6, 9, 22, 25, 28, 29, 41, 43]. Once generated, such
signatures can block spam from ongoing campaigns, and the
set of source IPs could be useful against future ones.
Such content-analysis, however, is computationally expen-
sive and may have privacy implications. Therefore, this pa-
per proposes an alternative model to arrive at botnet group-
ings leveraging only IP blacklists and their temporal listing
patterns. This builds on a simple intuition: IP addresses
which have a history of being blacklisted“together”are likely
participants in the same spam campaigns/botnet. In prac-
tice, factors such as infection lifetimes and DHCP address
space complicate trend development.
To gain insight into these dynamics and to investigate the
feasibility of spam mitigation using temporal correlations,
we subscribe to a popular blacklist provider [1]. Nearly one-
and-a-half years of blacklist data has been collected, encom-
passing roughly 500 million listings. This extensive dataset
is first used to conduct a measurement study on long-term
blacklist and botnet behavior. Then, techniques from data
mining and association rule learning are applied to search
for temporally correlated IP sets.
Disappointingly, we find that statistically sound groupings
(i.e., association rules) are rare (i.e., most have low interest
metrics). Reinforcing this, we evaluate these rules/metrics
in two respects. First, we measure the degree of correlation
between known members of the Cutwail and Kraken bot-
nets. Second, we gauge the ability of rules to predict future
blacklist events. In both tasks, temporal learning allows our
methods to outperform pure chance. However, the rarity of
meaningful rules means our technique is only effective for
trivial portions of the problem space.
This outcome demands a discussion of why our technique
was not more successful. We consider that: (1) blacklists
may be too narrow a data source to capture the complexities
of spam campaigns, and (2) that our straightforward min-
ing technique may be ill-equipped to model the extremely
dynamic nature of botnet operations.
Given that our technique does outperform a control clas-
sifier, it could potentially be used to improve more robust
predictors. However, we believe the more valuable contribu-
tions of this work are: (1) an adaptation of temporal data
mining techniques for use over spam blacklist data, creating
a foundational model on which future refinements can build,
and (2) a discussion and quantification of the temporal dy-
namism by which blacklists and botnets operate.
This paper proceeds as follows: first, related work is re-
viewed (Sec. 2). Next, our dataset and blacklist opera-
tion are discussed, before conducting a measurement study
(Sec. 3). Thereafter, a model for temporally mining black-
list history is presented (Sec. 4). This model is then empiri-
cally evaluated and performance shortcomings are discussed
(Sec. 5). Finally, concluding remarks are made (Sec. 6).
2. RELATED WORK
Here, related work is surveyed – both as it pertains to
blacklists, spam, and botnet operation (Sec. 2.1), as well as
association rule mining (Sec. 2.2).
2.1 Blacklists & Botnet Dynamics
IP blacklists are this writing’s ground-truth for investigat-
ing spam behavior. Previous writings have addressed such
lists, examining their operation and comparative effective-
ness [12, 23, 31, 39]. While blacklists are rarely criticized
for being inaccurate (i.e., false-positives), latency and lack
of coverage have been identified as issues [33].
Much prior work has focused on extrapolating from ground
truth about spamming IP addresses – blacklists included – to
discover additional malicious IPs. Of particular interest are
techniques leveraging the spatial distribution of spamming
IP addresses [30, 33, 38, 39]. At various granularity (e.g.,
AS, subnet, rDNS host), these mechanisms calculate repu-
tations for groups and apply them to mails sent from group
members. However, most such groupings are contiguous
in address space, a dangerous assumption given the rising
prevalence of botnets [37, 43]. In Sec. 4, we propose a novel
means to discover non-contiguous spamming groups (i.e.,
botnets). Once discovered, such groups can easily be inter-
faced/integrated with existing reputation frameworks [39].
Of course, we are not the first to address botnet-node
detection. One line of research has focused on parsing P2P
communication patterns from expansive (i.e., non-local) net-
work graphs [18, 27]. Our proposed technique (Sec. 4) cap-
tures global trends by the very nature of blacklist construc-
tion (Sec. 3.1), without the need for broad views.
An alternate means of botnet discovery has been using
similarity algorithms [8] to correlate spam email bodies or
the URLs they contain (and therefore, their senders) [6, 9,
22, 25, 28, 29, 41, 43]. Once found, such patterns can be
used to generate anti-spam signatures or form the basis for
analyzing botnet operations. Our technique (Sec. 4) is simi-
lar, but correlates using only blacklist timestamps. Further,
since we are not reliant on content analysis, our proposal
may have greater scalability and less privacy implications.
No matter the technique, an understanding of botnet op-
erations is critical to the detection task. Recent botnet in-
filtrations [24, 35, 36] and measurement studies [6, 9, 22, 28,
37, 43] are invaluable in this regard. We rely on these to
help us parameterize our learning technique in Sec. 4. Our
own measurement study (Sec. 3.3) rooted in blacklist data
complements these findings.
2.2 Association Mining
To detect temporal correlations between IP addresses in
our dataset, we rely on data mining techniques from the do-
main of association rule learning. Seminal algorithms such
as Apriori [4] and FP-Growth [19] may be familiar to read-
ers, but are reliant on discrete and unordered transactional
data. Sequential mining [5, 34] does enforce ordering, but
only uni-directionally (i.e., in a forward-looking fashion).
Our blacklist data defies both assumptions. First, it is
continuously distributed and therefore not well “binned”into
transactions. Second, we wish to capture bi-directional as-
sociations (i.e., the blacklisting of one address must not
strictly precede/follow another). Therefore, our work falls
into the broader domain of temporal association learning. In
this field, data-specific solutions are the norm, with much
literature simply describing the challenges [7, 10, 21, 42].
In Sec. 4.1 we describe the basic concepts of association
mining as we introduce our learning strategy. Although
guided by existing research, our approach of Sec. 4 is quite
ad-hoc and adapted to the peculiarities of our dataset. Mod-
ifying these algorithms for online use will be non-trivial, but
likely build on the suggestions of [17, 21].
3. BLACKLISTS
Next, we discuss general blacklist terminology and oper-
ation (Sec. 3.1), before focusing on the specific blacklist(s)
used for data collection (Sec. 3.2). Then, this data is the
basis for conducting a measurement study (Sec. 3.3).
3.1 Blacklist Operation
IP blacklists are lists of IP addresses that are believed to
be sources of email spam. Such lists are installed on (or
queried by) email servers, which usually refuse receipt of
messages from listed senders. Blacklists are popular: one
provider [1] claims to protect 1.5 billion inboxes.
Blacklists evolve over time, as providers add and remove
IP addresses. An IP address appearing in the most recent
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Figure 1: Blacklist size
PROPERTY XBL-#
listings collected 467 mil.
unique IP addresses 126 mil.
average snapshot size 7.8 mil.
daily churn/turnover 0.9 mil.
unique AS homes 23,296
AS for 25% of listings 11
AS for 50% of listings 40
AS for 90% of listings 378
Table 1: XBL properties over
17-month data collection
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Figure 2: Address space
version of a blacklist is said to be actively listed. When an
IP is added to the list it is a listing and removals are called
delistings. When an address becomes active (again) after
de-listing it is termed a relisting. Relistings are of particular
interest given our use of pattern mining.
Blacklist providers must also decide which IP addresses
to list, and the specifics of these decision policies are care-
fully guarded to prevent evasion. Anecdotally, major mail
providers (with broad Internet views) are believed to be sig-
nificant sources of evidence, along with honeypot data.
Similarly, policies dictate how/when delisting should oc-
cur. Many blacklists offer channels by which false-positives
can be submitted and corrected. Beyond this, common
delisting strategies include: (1) manual verification of inno-
cence, (2) static time-to-live (TTL), and (3) dynamic TTL
(based on behavior during the blacklist period). No doubt,
the legal challenges brought against blacklist providers [2]
force these policies to be somewhat conservative.
3.2 Data Collection
To collect blacklist data, we subscribe to the Spamhaus
service [1], which provides three blacklists of interest:
• Exploits Block List (XBL): Listing of IPs caught
sending spam as the result of hijacking, trojans, and
other malicious infection (i.e., botnet nodes).
• Spamhaus Block List (SBL): Manually-maintained
listing of IPs of spamming organizations. Typically
static IP blocks controlled/owned by spam gangs.
• Policy Block List (PBL): Preventative listings of
IPs that should not be sending any mail “on principle.”
Because the XBL: (1) captures botnet behavior, (2) is
large, and (3) is quite dynamic (as made explicit in Sec. 3.3),
it is our primary focus1 (see Tab. 1 for properties of this
list). Nonetheless, the other two lists are of casual interest.
The SBL aids in quantifying broad spamming patterns. The
PBL (not disjoint from the other two lists) is used to reason
about the prevalence of DHCP botnet IPs [40].
Data was collected between 2009-08-01 and 2011-01-01 (17
months, or 518 days), with blacklist updates pulled at 30-
minute intervals2. The diff was calculated between con-
secutive versions to determine new listings and delistings.
These events were written to a blacklist history, H :
H = {L1, L2, . . .}, L = (IP, tsin, tsout, AS)
1For the remainder of this work, the XBL is the sole focus of
discussion and processing, unless otherwise made explicit.
2The actual blacklist file stores listing times at second accuracy.
which is composed of individual listings. Listings, L, are a
4-tuple recording: the (1) IP blacklisted, (2) time of listing,
(3) time of delisting (initially, tsout = ∅), and (4) the AS(es)
which home the IP address (per [3]).
3.3 Blacklist Analysis
Having collected blacklist history, a measurement study is
now conducted. While quantifying spam behaviors is inter-
esting in its own right, our findings also help parameterize
our temporal mining efforts (Sec. 4). While none of the mea-
sures quantified here are novel (see [31, 39]), we emphasize
that they: (1) are measured over blacklist data, (2) capture
global trends, (3) are of a broad duration, and (4) reflect
recent trends (critical given the evolving spam landscape).
Blacklist Magnitude: For analysis, it is desirable that
the size of the blacklist is roughly proportional to the to-
tal volume of email spam being sent. Fortunately, Fig. 1
shows that the XBL size correlates well with such graphs
in literature [37]. Similarly, noteworthy spam events can be
identified in Fig. 1. For example, Dec. 2009 shows a spam
spike typical of the holiday season [15]. Moreover, the down-
ward trend beginning in Sep. 2010 can be attributed to the
closure of a major spam affiliate at that time [15, 37].
Focusing on more narrow time windows produces graphs
that are very jagged in nature. This is intuitive: spam cam-
paigns3 are likely to produce multiple listings in short dura-
tion (the key intuition behind our temporal mining efforts).
Similarly, the XBL’s static delisting policy (see below) dic-
tates that campaign IPs will be delisted together.
IP Address Spectrum: Fig. 2 visualizes listings as a func-
tion of IP address space. Clearly, certain regions are respon-
sible for a majority of XBL blacklist activity. A similar ob-
servation was made in [31], although the problematic regions
have shifted slightly since that writing. It is precisely these
patterns that spatial methodologies [30, 33, 38, 39] attempt
to harness, although [31] found that these same regions also
account for a significant portion of legitimate mail.
Accordingly, geo-locating IP addresses shows that several
geographical regions are responsible for many blacklisting
events, namely Asia and Eastern Europe. Interesting to note
is the 186.* - 190.* space, mapping primarily to Brazil.
Research indicates that Brazil was a targeted infection re-
gion for the Rustock botnet [37], prior to its 2011 take-down.
3Campaigns are coordinated spam-sending efforts promoting the
same product or service. By using aggressive sending strategies,
campaigns intend to maximize the utility of domains/content/etc.
against the latency of blacklisting and signature-based detection.
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Botnet operators are aware of these spatial patterns and
the ease with which they can be identified. Thus, at the
campaign-level, botnets often leverage their distributed na-
ture to span address space. Our temporal mining (Sec. 4)
attempts to discover such non-contiguous patterns.
DHCP Addresses: To determine what percentage of XBL
listings are homed in dynamic IP space, the PBL is lever-
aged. The PBL is really two lists: (1) a dynamic space list
maintained by Spamhaus (acquired from Dynablock [40]),
and (2) IP space, identified by local network administrators,
that should not be sending any mail. While the latter con-
tains some DHCP addresses, Spamhaus also encourages the
addition of mail-server prohibited static space (e.g., com-
puter labs, corporate desktops, etc.). While distinction is
made between the two top-level lists, static vs. dynamic
annotations are not made in the “local admin” set.
Of the ≈126 million unique IP addresses appearing on
the XBL, some 119 million (90%) also eventually appear on
the PBL4. Concentrating just on the PBL portion which is
known to be dynamic that figure falls to 79.0%. Regardless,
this is significantly higher than the proportion of PBL IPs
in all address space, which we estimate to be 18.4% (after
bogon and special-purpose IP space is discarded).
This result has a significant affect on our temporal min-
ing methods (Sec. 4). For an association rule to be useful,
entities need to have persistent identifiers throughout the
learning window. A high level of dynamism therefore makes
narrow training windows desirable, the trade-offs and prac-
tical sizing of which is discussed in Sec. 4.2.
Listing Duration & Churn: A contradictory factor in
sizing the training window is that it must be sufficiently long:
only IPs with multiple (re)-listings in a window will have
a pattern history sufficient for rule generation. Crucially,
relisting can only occur as fast as delisting takes place.
As Fig. 3 shows, most XBL listings have a duration near
7.5 days. This consistency speaks to the “static TTL”policy
the XBL employs (the smaller and more static SBL uses
manual verification). The near-uniform listing interval also
means that delisting times (tsout) hold little value, since they
are implicit based on arrival times. Thus, when temporally
mining, only arrival timestamps (tsin) are correlated.
Given that XBL delisting occurs frequently, it is intuitive
that the list can be characterized as highly volatile and dy-
namic – and therefore capable of producing interesting tem-
poral patterns. The XBL churns or “turns-over” 11.4% of
its 7.8 million listings each day (see Tab. 1). In comparison,
4Given that the PBL is primarily a monotonically growing list,
only the PBL snapshot at our study’s conclusion is considered.
the SBL churns just 0.46% of its volume daily. This static
nature is the primary reason the SBL, although an effective
blacklist, is downplayed in this work.
Relisting & Turnover: Given that an XBL IP is delisted
after one week’s time, we are interested in how quick/often
spammers re-utilize that address, resulting in a subsequent
relisting event. While na¨ıve reuse maximizes address utility,
it is also characteristic of spamming behavior and can be
easily captured by simple reputation functions [39].
Fig. 4 indicates that at median, a relisting will happen ≈5
weeks after delisting (not including the week on the black-
list) with the first quartile reappearing in under 10 days.
Notice that in 25% of cases a subsequent listing is not seen
in our study period. Since only IPs with multiple listings are
relevant for temporal mining, Fig. 4 also plots relisting inter-
vals for those IPs with 5+ listings, showing a more favorable
median time-to-relisting of around 18 days.
The prevalence of IP addresses with significant relisting
histories, as plotted in Fig. 5, is paramount. While 45% of
unique IPs have only a single listing, 20% have 5+ listings.
These upper 20% account for 66% of all blacklisting events.
This is encouraging: non-trivial histories exist for a con-
siderable portion of the problem space. Moreover, an IP’s
listing times tend to be temporally clustered, not uniformly
distributed over the data period.
4. TEMPORAL MINING
The mining of blacklist histories for temporal association
rules, as described in this section, is a novel contribution of
this work. Although established mechanisms are the basis
for our mining model5, their application to blacklist data
requires both special considerations and careful variable se-
lection. Discussion begins with a mathematical description
of our model (Sec. 4.1). Then, results from our blacklist
measurement study are used to parameterize (Sec. 4.2) an
implementation (Sec. 4.3) of the technique.
4.1 Association Mining Model
The goal of the mining process is to produce association
rules which capture the temporal patterns of IP addresses
in a blacklist history. For example, one such rule might be:
IPx ⇒ IPy. That is, IPy typically appears on the blacklist
around the time IPx does. Such a rule can then be applied
in an online fashion. For instance, if IPx has just been black-
listed, one could proactively blacklist IPy (Sec. 5.3). Alter-
natively, one could conclude that IPx and IPy are members
of the same botnet (Sec. 5.2).
5Even so, we present these concepts somewhat pedantically, both
for completeness and for the benefit of an anti-spam audience.
IP3
IP4
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
IP2IP1
IP5
IP6
(b)
(a)
= listing = correlation
len(H’)
Figure 6: (a) Timeline structure with correlation
radius; (b) IP pair with two correlation events.
The input to our mining model is a blacklist history, H ′ =
{L′1, L
′
2, . . . L
′
n} composed of listings, L
′ = (IP, tsin), a sub-
set of the data described in Sec. 3.2. The time duration
which H ′ spans is termed the learning window, having length
len(H ′) = ∀L′n ∈ H
′, [max(L′n.tsin)−min(L
′
n.tsin)].
It is helpful to visualize H ′ as a timeline of listing events,
as done in Fig. 6a. For example, IP1 is listed at time t0, IP2
at time t2, and so on. Using this, it is easy to see correlation
events, the atomic notion on which rules are built. Two
listings, L′i, L
′
j ∈ H
′, are said to be correlated, corr(L′i, L
′
j) =
1, if if they occur within, r, a correlation time radius of each
other, i.e., (L′j .tsin − r ≤ L
′
i.tsin ≤ L
′
j .tsin + r).
Note that correlation relationship is symmetric but non-
associative. For example, choosing r = 2 as shown in Fig. 6a,
we see that corr(IP3, IP2) = 1 and corr(IP2, IP3) = 1 (sym-
metry). While corr(IP1, IP2) = corr(IP2, IP3) = 1, we observe
that, corr(IP1, IP3) = 0 (i.e., association does not hold).
Note that the radius is drawn only after the input param-
eters are known. This is a practical requirement given that
listing timestamps are continuously distributed. In contrast,
most mining algorithms operate over transactional data [10].
Coercing our data into such “bins” is undesirable: two list-
ings occurring a single time unit apart could be binned sep-
arately, making them “non-correlated”.
Ultimately, we are not interested in correlations between
listings, but correlations between IP addresses. Thus, we
construct a function, list(IPx) = {L
′
1, L
′
2 . . . L
′
n}, producing
a set of all listings in which IPx appears. This is useful in
counting the number of correlations two IP addresses have
over entire training window:
corr pair(IPx, IPy) =
P
lx∈list(IPx),
ly∈list(IPy)
corr(lx, ly)
For example, looking at Fig. 6b we see that, |list(IP5)| = 4,
|list(IP6)| = 5, and corr pair(IP5, IP6) = 2.
Such absolute counts are more meaningful if normalized
by the size of the search-space/training-window. This is a
well-known data mining concept known as support [16]:
supp(IPx) =
|list(IPx)|
len(H ′)/2r
supp pair(IPx, IPy) =
corr pair(IPx, IPy)
len(H ′)/2r
Here, the correlation diameter (2r) is treated as the “bin
size”, and the denominator counts the number of bins in the
training window. Then, we compute the fraction of bins in
which an event of interest (listing/correlation) occurs6.
Any pair7 of IP addresses can be written as an association
rule of the form, IPx ⇒ IPy (i.e., implication). However, a
rule is only useful if it is interesting, and interest metrics
are used to quantify this notion. The interest metric used
in this work is lift [16]:
lift(IPx ⇒ IPy) = lift(IPx, IPy) =
supp pair(IPx, IPy)
supp(IPx)× supp(IPy)
Lift is a probabilistic ratio that relates the actual support to
the expected support that would occur as the result of ran-
dom chance. High lift is indicative of an association that is
unlikely to occur randomly. Lift was chosen to quantify rules
because of its, (1) probabilistic interpretation and (2) sym-
metric nature, which can reduce rule search-space by half.
Alternative interest metrics are described in [16].
Having this, one can now compute a lift-measure for all
pairs of IP addresses in H ′:
lift(H ′) =
2
6664
− lift(IP1, IP2) · · · lift(IP1, IPn)
lift(IP2, IP1) − · · · lift(IP2, IPn)
...
...
. . .
...
lift(IPn, IP1) lift(IPn, IP2) · · · −
3
7775
Needless to say, the O(n2) complexity of this operation is
problematic. Thus, the search space is often constrained us-
ing the notion of minimum support, M , whereby no rules
producing supp pair() < M are considered. Therefore, ad-
dresses having |list(IPx)| < M can be discarded from the
matrix, using the downward closure property. In Sec. 4.3 we
describe programmatic steps to improve scalability.
Having produced the lift(H ′) matrix, each row is sorted by
the lift-metric (in descending order) to produce an ordered
“best-pairs” list for all IP addresses (associated lift values
are also retained, but not displayed):
best pairs(IPx) = [IPa, IPb . . . IPz], where
lift(IPx, IPa) ≥ lift(IPx, IPb) ≥ . . . lift(IPx, IPz) > 0
This list, generated over prior observed events, can then be
applied online. For reasons described in the next section, we
believe this model can capture botnet signatures. Therefore,
we are hopeful that top-ranking pairs can capture shared
botnet membership (Sec. 5.2), and later we use best-pairs
as the basis for predicting future listing events (Sec. 5.3).
4.2 Variable Selection
We are hopeful our temporal mining technique is capable
of capturing malicious behaviors. However, the dynamic na-
ture of spamming operations, botnet infections, and address
space complicate this task. To account for these, the free
variables of the model must be properly selected.
The breadth/complexity of experiments (Sec. 4.3) make
empirical trial-and-error costly. Thus, parameters are ar-
6Bin-size (2r) is constant per our correlation radius. Thus, when
computing corr(), in effect, we simply slide bins until an IP ad-
dress of interest lies at some bin’s midpoint. This does not affect
the number of bins, nor the random probability of two events ap-
pearing in the same bin. Thus, our support calculation captures
the same notion it would over inherently transactional data.
7We present these notions pair-wise for simplicity. They are also
easily generalized to sets of IP addresses (i.e., {IPx, IPy} ⇒ {IPz}).
rived at logically8. Assisting in this regard are the blacklist
measurement study of Sec. 3.3 and empirical botnet litera-
ture. We now address the free variables individually:
Correlation Radius: Given that spam campaigns are ini-
tiated en masse, one would expect to see associated partic-
ipants blacklisted in close temporal proximity. Thus, the
correlation radius (r) needs set to capture the arrivals of
a typical campaign, while minimizing other blacklist traffic
(e.g., intersections with other campaigns). Fig. 1 indicates
that localized listings spikes are not uncommon.
In their post-mortem analysis of the Cutwail botnet (see
also Sec. 5.2) the authors of [36] show that blacklisting rates
peak 1–2 hours after a node comes“online.” An earlier study
of the Storm botnet [24] reported that nodes arrived on a
blacklist within 1.5 hours, at median, after being instructed
to begin spamming. Additional literature supports timings
in the “several hour” range. For example, [43] states that
70% of spam emails are sent by campaigns lasting less than
8 hours. The same study indicates that large botnets tend
to operate the least aggressive campaigns.
Given Cutwail’s large size [37] and the recency of [36], we
believe r = 2 hours is a reasonable radius selection (this will
makes the capture window 4 hours in breadth). In mak-
ing this choice, we choose not to accommodate the lengthy
tails of “time to blacklist” distributions – instead prioritiz-
ing a narrow radius to minimize noise. We note that there
exists conflicting evidence that some campaigns are very
lengthy [28] (e.g., weeks). Our model cannot reasonably ac-
commodate such a radius, and we acknowledge that nodes
participating in such campaigns may correlate poorly.
Training Window: Determining an appropriate training
window size is challenging. First, we discuss two aspects sup-
porting a narrow training window: (1) infection lifetime and
(2) IP dynamics (DHCP). Then, we consider two contradic-
tory factors: (3) the need for sufficient pattern development
and (4) bot-to-campaign allocation.
For association rules to develop, it is important that a
node stays under botnet control throughout the training
window. Anecdotal evidence places infection lifetimes at
“years” [14]. Even if inflated, infections lasting “months” are
sufficient given the other constraints of this section.
In particular, understanding dynamic address space is crit-
ical, as blacklists identify only IPs, not unique machines.
DHCP has been researched as it pertains to spamming [40]
and the measurement of botnet size [35, 43]. The former
study reports that 42% of spam mail is received from dy-
namic hosts (far lower than our estimations of Sec. 3.3; see
also Sec. 5.4). More important than if an IP is dynamic is
how dynamic it is: dynamic IPs can be treated as persistent
identifiers if they do not churn inside the training window.
While dial-up/DSL connections tend to churn hourly or
daily, [40] found that 70% of one cable-Internet company’s
subscribers retained their addresses for over a month (the
extent of their study). Anecdotal evidence shows cable In-
ternet IP retention-times can be as long as years [11].
Fortunately, highly dynamic IPs should implicitly exclude
themselves from association rules due to minimum support
8In Sec. 5 we gauge the accuracy of our variable selections over
ground-truth. However, reverse-engineering optimal values from
this data is inappropriate because: (1) it could favorably bias
results and (2) parameters may not speak to global behavior.
PROPERTY LISTS PCT UNIQ-IP PCT
total listings 69,188,643 100% 41,455,265 100%
min. supp. ≥ 2 43,809,390 63% 16,076,012 39%
min. supp. ≥ 3 26,395,188 38% 7,368,911 18%
min. supp. ≥ 4 13,559,703 20% 3,090,416 7%
min. supp. ≥ 5 5,089,743 7% 972,926 2.3%
min. supp. ≥ 6 1,177,078 1.7% 190,393 0.5%
Table 2: Training window support levels, interval
Sep. 1, 2010 (inclusive) – Dec. 1, 2010 (exclusive)
(M) constraints. For example, given that it takes at mini-
mum 7.5 days (per Fig. 3) for an IP to relist, IPs churning
weekly (or faster) cannot conform to M ≥ 2. Only IPs with
expected renewal in the range [7.5M, len(H ′)] are likely to be
noisy for our model. Fortunately, [40] suggests that volatil-
ity might be bi-modally distributed based on service type,
minimizing the quantity of IPs in this “dangerous range.”
With the previous two factors supporting a short training
window, we now discuss aspects of botnet operation that
suggest lengthy windows might be more appropriate.
First, the training window must be long enough to allow
patterns/support to develop. Fig. 3 shows that relistings
require at least 7.5 days, and when combined with Fig. 4,
the median time-to-relisting is just over one month. How-
ever, since highly dynamic IPs are unlikely to accumulate
minimum support, the median turnover of “relevant” IPs is
somewhat quicker (also, Fig. 4), at about three weeks.
While this is encouraging at the single IP level, correla-
tions are non-singular. That is, even if IPs are in the same
botnet, they must participate in the same campaigns in or-
der to associate. Work shows that 80% of botnets use less
than half of their available bots in a campaign [43], while [36]
confirms one bot served multiple“clients”simultaneously. Of
benefit to our model, one source [22] reports that some bot-
nets partition campaigns statically across available nodes.
Synthesizing these trade-offs into a single parameter is
non-trivial. However, combining the above evidence and the
computational constraints of Sec. 4.3, we believe len(H ′) = 3
months is a reasonable starting point for analysis.
Minimum Support: Generally, raising the minimum sup-
port, M , of the model increases scalability at the expense of
excluding IPs from analysis. Such exclusion reduces the por-
tion of problem space to which rule application is possible
(i.e., the evaluation tasks of Secs. 5.2, 5.3). That being said,
there is no use in generating weak rules. Tab. 2 examines
this trade-off at varying support levels over a 3-month train-
ing window. Because it is feasible to compute (see Sec. 4.3),
the conservative9 choice of M = 3 is made.
4.3 Implementation & Scalability
We next implement the lift-matrix and best-pairs compu-
tations of our model (Sec. 4.1). With the average training
window containing 7.4 million unique IPs (with M ≥ 3,
Tab. 2), the lift-matrix has 54.3 trillion entries.
Fortunately, the lift-matrix is sparse: just ≈2% of all el-
ements are non-zero (the IP-pair having at least one corre-
lation). Leveraging this, the history (H ′) is indexed both
by time-stamp and IP address. In this manner, lift-matrix
rows can be efficiently computed using a multi-set built from
9Once computed and persistently stored, rules can be further fil-
tered by support, lift, etc.. based on application-specific criteria.
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set intersections (all IPs in some radius). Then, each row is
immediately condensed into a best-pairs list, which is trun-
cated at reasonable length and persistently stored.
While we make no claims about the optimality of this
approach, at minimum, it makes the problem a tractable
one. Keeping the structures/indexes entirely in memory, it
takes ≈3 days to compute all 7.4 million best-pairs lists us-
ing a multi-threaded implementation and a single machine
with modern hardware (8GB+ memory, quad-core proces-
sor). The task is trivially parallel-izable and nodes were
leased from a large cloud provider to speed experimentation.
Of course, these statistics represent just a single training
window, and a live implementation needs retraining. Fortu-
nately, given that blacklisted IPs require at least one week to
turnover (Fig. 3), a predictive application would require re-
training on approximately the same interval10. This simply
establishes the feasibility of a working implementation: in-
cremental/online calculations could improve scalability con-
siderably, but are not investigated in this writing.
5. MINING RESULTS
In this section, we examine the results of temporal learn-
ing. First, we examine the association rules and their statis-
tical significance (Sec. 5.1). Then, we evaluate these rules’
capability to capture botnet membership (Sec. 5.2) and pre-
dict future blacklistings (Sec. 5.3). Finally, we discuss these
results and suggest refinements to our model (Sec. 5.4).
5.1 Association Rule Significance
Having exhaustively computed lift-pairs for all IPs meet-
ing minimum support, focus now turns to the statistical sig-
nificance of those pairs and the best-pairs lists which aggre-
gate them. All results are generated using a training window
over the three months preceding Dec. 1, 2010 (see Tab. 2),
the same one used in predictive evaluation (Sec. 5.3).
Pairwise Lift Distribution: The nature of botnet opera-
tions indicates that strong correlations should occur at rates
exceeding pure chance; we now test this notion.
To do so, we compare the empirical distribution of lift val-
ues seen when computing lift(H ′) against those of temporally
randomized versions, H ′rand, of the same history (processed
until convergent). Fig. 7 and Tab. 3 display this comparison,
10Consider that if IPx is blacklisted at this instant, it will be one-
week until it is delisted. Given the known blacklist status of IPx,
there is no need to predict it. Thus, any rules created/modified as
a result of the current listing are irrelevant until delisting occurs
and retraining can be delayed until (at most) that time.
RANDOM EMPIRICAL
LIFT prob. exp. prob. exp. ERR
≥ 0 100% 7.4 mil. 100% 7.4 mil. 1.00
> 0 2.410% 177,557 1.991% 146,730 1.21
≥ 45 1.370% 100,931 0.768% 56,617 1.78
≥ 60 0.599% 44,122 0.641% 47,270 0.93
≥ 72 0.008% 626 0.014% 1032 0.61
≥ 90 0.006% 446 0.009% 728 0.61
≥ 120 0.002% 137 0.003% 243 0.56
≥ 135 <.001% 0.51 <.001% 1.40 0.36
Table 3: (Prob)abilities and (exp)ected row
distributions (length = 7.4 million), per Fig. 7.
ERR (error) = exp(random))/exp(empirical)
showing the probability that an IP pair, picked at random,
will produce some lift value11. Tab. 3 also presents the more
intuitive notion of “expected row distribution.” That is, if
one were to pick a row at random from lift(H ′) or lift(H ′rand),
what lift values should one expect to see, and in what quan-
tity? (i.e., what should the best-pairs list look like?).
First, we observe that for ≈98% of pairs, lift = 0, indicat-
ing they have no correlations. In what may seem counter-
intuitive, for lift ≤ 45, the random distribution outperforms
the empirical one. However, this is expected behavior: as a
consequence of some pairs correlating well (i.e., at lift ≥ 60),
the inverse should also hold (i.e., some pairs correlate worse
than random). Moreover, strong correlations across the en-
tire problem space would be unusual. After all, shared-
botnet pairs are likely a very small fraction of all pairs. It is
unsurprising to see that only about 0.6% of pairs (see Tab. 3)
correlate stronger than random chance.
In practice, only the highest lift values require examina-
tion, since best-pairs lists are truncated for spatial efficiency.
Unfortunately, there are no lift-values (and therefore, no
pairs of IPs) that are overwhelmingly correlated. Even in
the best cases, where lift ≥ 135, there is still a 36% proba-
bility the pair is the result of random chance. Clearly, these
are not ideal assurances. Nonetheless, by examining the en-
tire best-pairs vector, further traction can be made.
Aggregate Policies: Single lift values encode far less in-
formation than the entire best-pairs vector. For example,
when assessing IPx, one should obtain best pairs(IPx). One
could simply examine that head of that list. Alternatively,
one could query the top-n pairs using a voting strategy. If a
strong-majority agree on a particular assessment/outcome,
the error rate (of the assessment) will be a function of voter
error-rates and far less than that of any single element.
We can imagine arbitrarily complex policies being written
in this fashion, involving: (1) the best pairs list, (2) the
associated lift values, (3) voting thresholds, (4) a relative
measure of how a best-pairs list compares to its expected-
value, and (5) deeper mining, such as the lift() value for any
two-pairs voting in agreement.
We make no claims as to the optimality of any aggregate
approach (indeed, they are likely application specific). How-
ever, as a proof-of-concept we test one such voting policy in
Sec. 5.3, showing that it out-performs na¨ıve pair-wise efforts.
11Recall that lift does have a probabilistic interpretation: the ratio
of observed support to expected (random) support, as a function
of a single trial. Given our multi-trillion element trial space, lift
values become most useful when interpreted relatively.
PROPERTY {cutwail} PCT {kraken} PCT
unique IP addresses 319,631 100% 318,022 100%
PBL address 271,370 85% 277,581 87%
PBL-DHCP (§3.3) 237,326 74% 254,429 80%
listed in window 216,284 68% 247,040 78%
min. support ≥ 3 123,125 39% 141,043 44%
⇓ · · · · · · · · · · · ·
min. support ≥ 3 123,125 100% 141,043 100%
. . . + PBL address 119,076 97% 137,237 97%
. . .+ PBL-DHCP 106,182 86% 126,659 90%
Table 4: Botnet ground-truth statistics, with focus
on IP subset where min. support ≥ 3
5.2 Case Studies: Cutwail and Kraken
We next evaluate association rules’ capability to capture
shared botnet membership, using actual botnet data.
Data/Method: We were fortunate to obtain ground-truth
regarding the membership of two botnets. First, a list of
319,631 IPs known to be “Cutwail” participants between
May 1, 2010 and Aug. 1, 2010 was obtained (see [36]). Sec-
ond, a list of 318,022 IPS which connected to a “Kraken”
sinkhole on May 27, 2010 was procured (see [13, 26]).
Mathematically, we refer to these sets as {cutwail} and
{kraken}, respectively. See Tab. 4 for statistics about these
sets, especially as they relate to the XBL blacklist. Training
windows were drawn over the entire data period (Cutwail)
or centered about the snapshot date (Kraken). Computa-
tion used the same parameters as previously discussed (i.e.,
len(H ′) = 3 months, r = 2 hours, and M = 3).
To evaluate, the lift() matrices are computed. Then, we
characterize and quantify lift(IPx, IPy) values where IPx ∧
IPy ∈ {kraken}, those cases where two IPs share botnet mem-
bership. The {cutwail} set is handled equivalently.
Results: Preliminarily, we see that 68–78% of known bot-
net members are listed on the XBL during their respective
training window (Tab. 4). It is impossible to determine why
the remainder of IPs were not listed: we have no confirma-
tion they even sent spam email. Concentrating on those IPs
that were caught, 123k-141k of them were listed 3+ times
in the training window, meeting minimum support.
Given that requirement, 39–44% of known botnet mem-
bers are present in the lift-matrix computation. Focusing
specifically on Kraken, we know the size of the lift matrix
(and therefore, best-pairs vectors) to be 9.3 million (all IPs
meeting min. support in the training window). Thus, if one
examines any best pairs(IPx), IPx ∈ {kraken} vector, there
will be 141,043 elements (IPy) meeting IPx ∧ IPy ∈ {kraken}.
Thus, the probability of picking an IPy at random is 1.513%.
This probability is the control line in Fig. 8, which is the
precision-recall curve built from using lift values to predict
shared botnet membership. Most encouragingly, we find
that 6.0% of shared-membership pairs have non-zero lift val-
ues, compared to 2.8% of disjoint ones. Moreover, this is a
probability difference present for roughly 95% of recall space.
However, when viewed in absolute terms, results are less
inspiring. Even the highest lift values only produce precision
values around 4.5% for Kraken data. The inset of Fig. 8 dis-
plays the entirety of the zoomed outset graph, showing the
classifier’s benefit is virtually imperceptible at traditional
scale. Cutwail analysis produced similarly poor results.
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shared botnet membership task. (inset) Full graph.
5.3 Predicting Blacklist Events
The previous section underscores that single IP-pairs are
shallow/weak predictors of behavior. Thus, set-based vot-
ing strategies are applied to predict future blacklist events in
the hope that aggregate evidence proves more beneficial. In-
tuitively, proactive blacklisting can reduce spammer utility
and reduce end-user spam exposure.
Data/Method: To gauge predictive capability, we train
over the 3-months immediately preceding Dec. 1, 2010, with
the 5 proceeding days being the test period (an interval jus-
tified in Sec. 4.3). Tab. 2 shows some basic properties about
this training period, chosen due to its recency12.
The prediction process is as follows: the blacklist history
is replayed in-order. At any point, any number (including
zero) of predictions may be made, leveraging only prior in-
formation. A prediction is a statement of the expectation
that some IP address (for example, IPx) will soon be black-
listed. Predictions are evaluated using:
IF IPx actively blacklisted || IPx ∈ {predictions} : ∅
ELSE : {predictions} = IPx ∪ {predictions}
IF IPx listed in next r′ time : correct++;
ELSE : incorrect++;
Notice that an IP cannot be predicted multiple times, pre-
venting ballot stuffing. Our evaluation metric is the percent-
age of correct predictions, to all predictions. This metric is
not ideal: an incorrect prediction is not equivalent to an
email false-positive (the IP might not be sending any mail).
In contrast, correct predictions have a strong interpretation.
Given that the IP is soon blacklisted, we know that it is ac-
tively (or will soon begin) sending spam email: traffic that
proactive blacklisting can mitigate. Lastly, the“success win-
dow” is set to one day (i.e., r′ = 24 hours).
Given these ground rules, a policy must be written to
make predictions. Fig. 9 visualizes our proof of concept ap-
proach (at replay position tn). Summarily, we use a struc-
ture, {recent}, to store XBL listings occurring the past r
time. Whenever a new listing occurs, it is added to this
set, which is run over all best-pairs lists13, calculating the
union. The size of the union is then normalized by the length
of the list, producing a metric useful in predictive threshold-
ing. Less formally: “if y% of IPx’s best-pairs have recently
been blacklisted, predict IPx to be blacklisted”.
125-day sliding windows were computed for all of Dec. 2010. Result
similarity and brevity preclude presentation of this data.
13This operation is why lift(H′) must be exhaustively computed.
It is impossible to know a priori where a recently listed IP might
appear in best-pairs rule predicates.
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Figure 9: (a) Structures in predictive application.
(b) Filtering recent XBL history over best pairs.
Results: Preliminarily, the 3-month training window has
41.4 million unique IPs, reducing to 7.3 million with mini-
mum support (Tab. 2). There are 3.5 million listing events
in the 5-day test period, with 847,186 (23.8%) of those IPs
also appearing in the supported training set. This is an
upper-bound on the number of predictable blacklistings.
Given r′ = 24 hours, we can simulate the random proba-
bility of a correct prediction to be 2.77%. Implementing the
voting policy described above (and visualized in Fig. 9) at
varying prediction thresholds produces the results of Tab. 5.
Tab. 5 suggests there is some benefit in using aggregate
evidence, rather than simple lift-pairs. For example, perfor-
mance is 25%+ at points, while the precision never exceeded
4% in the botnet-membership task. Where strong voting
majorities exist, they are accurate. However, such majorities
seem hard to amass – making them useful over little problem
space (just 93 of 847k listings can be found at 25%+ accu-
racy). Unfortunately, this likely speaks to the high-level of
noise present across the best-pairs vectors. Clearly, the tech-
nique is inappropriate as a stand-alone predictor. However,
with scalability improvements, it could be an incremental
feature in a more robust network-level classifier [20, 39].
5.4 Discussion & Refinement
While many points could be discussed post-mortem, we
prefer to streamline discussion on three acute issues:
Dynamic IPs: From the outset, we recognized that that
some elements of spamming operations were too dynamic to
be pattern-mined. In particular, DHCP space was identified
as one area of concern. However, we assumed that such
addresses would naturally exclude themselves from problem
space by failing to accrue minimum support (Sec. 4.2).
Clearly, this assumption was flawed. Tab. 4 shows that
90%+ (possibly 97%) of botnet IPs meeting minimum sup-
port are dynamic. While a fraction of these IPs may have
lengthy leases (e.g., cable Internet), this seems unlikely to
account for this entire set. Moreover, botnet operators may
knowingly reserve static IP addresses for control channels,
meaning they never send mail or become blacklisted (Tab. 4).
Thus, these IPs fall outside the scope of rule learning (a seg-
ment we anticipated successfully mining).
How these dynamic IPs are able to attain minimum sup-
port remains an open question. However, it is clear this
area demands more research. Our analysis suggests that
dynamic IPs may be becoming more prevalent in botnet op-
THR CORR% ×RAND LIST
> 0% 3.47% 1.25× 47,184
≥ 10% 3.66% 1.32× 5,600
≥ 20% 17.34% 6.26× 161
≥ 25% 25.98% 9.38× 93
≥ 30% 35.63% 12.86× 57
Table 5: Prediction at varying (thr)esholds:
absolute (corr)ectness; relative to (rand)om
chance; and correctly predicted (list)ings count.
erations than previously reported ([40], see Sec. 3.3). The
reliable identification of DHCP space holds enormous poten-
tial, given that 96% of mail servers at dynamic IPs send only
spam [40]. If it were possible to not just detect dynamic IPs,
but also estimate their churn rates, one could better model
how association rules retain/lose value as time passes.
Window Sizes: As discussed in Sec. 4.2, there are contra-
dictory factors in sizing the training window and correlation
radius. Casual experimentation with alternative parameters
(i.e., aside from len(H ′) = 3 months and r = 2 hours) pro-
duced no significant benefits. Even rules which well-capture
training window patterns may be “expired” when they need
to be applied, Thus, we advocate improving our model with
less rigid notions of correlation and history.
For example, correlations could be modeled using a Gaus-
sian function. In this manner, IPs which correlate extremely
tightly (i.e., list at the exact same time) are weighted more
heavily than those occurring near the radius boundary. Sim-
ilarly, training windows can time-decay correlation events so
that those occurring in the recent past carry more weight.
As the model grows increasingly complex, it is important
to consider the scalability of these efforts. Indeed, scalabil-
ity improvements over content-processing approaches were a
primary motivator of this research, and one reason initial ef-
forts were so simply modeled. Moreover, efficiency is critical
in making this a practical working system.
Appropriateness of Blacklist Data: More fundamen-
tally, we must investigate if blacklists are the best ground-
truth over which to temporally mine. Despite our exten-
sive investment in blacklists, the answer is “probably not.”
Blacklists are attractive due to their concise encoding of
global spam histories (500 million listings = 12GB storage).
However, this same fact may be precisely their weakness.
Blacklists are a second-hand and aggregate data source
whose latency and lack of coverage [33] may skew known re-
sults about botnet operation. Their binary-nature and static
TTL delisting (of the XBL) provide little insight about the
behavior of an address that is actively listed. Most damn-
ingly, blacklists tend to evolve at rates not permitting sig-
nificant support to develop. Minimal support generates am-
biguous rules, precisely why we described aggregate voting
strategies (Sec. 5.1) to better utilize available information.
Ultimately, we must consider that our model may be most
appropriate over an alternative ground-truth. For example,
it could be installed on an email server. In this manner,
individual spam mail arrival times and source IPs could be
recorded and mined. Quantitative (non-binary) aggregates
could be derived and timestamps would be known accurate
(without latency). Further, metadata fields collected by the
mail server [20] could be helpful in inferring campaign group-
ings, without ever inspecting message content.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Herein, we have described and tested a model for tempo-
ral association learning over spam blacklist data. Unfortu-
nately, this effort delivered only trivial improvements over
control classifiers at significant computational cost. None-
theless, there is still utility in this negative result.
Our measurement study contributes to the growing knowl-
edge about spam behaviors and does so from a blacklist per-
spective. Moreover, our proposed temporal learning model
for blacklist data could serve as a foundation for more re-
fined efforts; those better capturing the dynamics of botnet
operation. Finally, evaluating our model allowed us to iden-
tify not only our own weaknesses, but also future areas of
research that will benefit the broader anti-spam effort.
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